TY - JOUR
T1 - What We Think Others Think and Do About Climate Change: A Multicountry Test of Pluralistic Ignorance and Public-Consensus Messaging
AU - Geiger, Sandra J.
AU - Köhler, Jana K.
AU - Delabrida, Zenith N. C.
AU - Garduño-Realivazquez, Karla A.
AU - Haugestad, Christian A. P.
AU - Imada, Hirotaka
AU - Iyer, Aishwarya
AU - Maharja, Carya
AU - Mann, Daniel C.
AU - Marczak, Michalina
AU - Melville, Olivia
AU - Nijssen, Sari R. R.
AU - Powdthavee, Nattavudh
AU - Praptiwi, Radisti A.
AU - Ranade, Gargi
AU - Rosa, Claudio D.
AU - Vitale, Valeria
AU - Winkowska, Małgorzata
AU - Zhang, Lei
AU - White, Mathew P.
PY - 2025/5/22
Y1 - 2025/5/22
N2 - Most people believe in human-caused climate change, yet this public consensus can be collectively underestimated (pluralistic ignorance). Across two studies using primary data (n = 3,653 adult participants; 11 countries) and secondary data (ns = 60,230 and 22,496 adult participants; 55 countries), we tested (a) the generalizability of pluralistic ignorance about climate-change beliefs, (b) the effects of a public-consensus intervention on climate action, and (c) the possibility that cultural tightness-looseness might serve as a country-level predictor of pluralistic ignorance. In Study 1, people across 11 countries underestimated the prevalence of proclimate views by at least 7.5% in Indonesia (90% credible interval, or CrI = [5.0, 10.1]), and up to 20.8% in Brazil (90% CrI = [18.2, 23.4]. Providing information about the actual public consensus on climate change was largely ineffective, except for a slight increase in willingness to express one’s proclimate opinion, δ = 0.05 (90% CrI = [−0.02, 0.11]). In Study 2, pluralistic ignorance about willingness to contribute financially to fight climate change was slightly more pronounced in looser than tighter cultures, highlighting the particular need for pluralistic-ignorance research in these countries.
AB - Most people believe in human-caused climate change, yet this public consensus can be collectively underestimated (pluralistic ignorance). Across two studies using primary data (n = 3,653 adult participants; 11 countries) and secondary data (ns = 60,230 and 22,496 adult participants; 55 countries), we tested (a) the generalizability of pluralistic ignorance about climate-change beliefs, (b) the effects of a public-consensus intervention on climate action, and (c) the possibility that cultural tightness-looseness might serve as a country-level predictor of pluralistic ignorance. In Study 1, people across 11 countries underestimated the prevalence of proclimate views by at least 7.5% in Indonesia (90% credible interval, or CrI = [5.0, 10.1]), and up to 20.8% in Brazil (90% CrI = [18.2, 23.4]. Providing information about the actual public consensus on climate change was largely ineffective, except for a slight increase in willingness to express one’s proclimate opinion, δ = 0.05 (90% CrI = [−0.02, 0.11]). In Study 2, pluralistic ignorance about willingness to contribute financially to fight climate change was slightly more pronounced in looser than tighter cultures, highlighting the particular need for pluralistic-ignorance research in these countries.
KW - climate change
KW - cross-country generalizability
KW - cultural tightness-looseness
KW - pluralistic ignorance
KW - social norm
UR - https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/context/psy-research/article/2150/viewcontent/Geiger_et_al_2025___pluralistic_ignorance.pdf
U2 - 10.1177/09567976251335585
DO - 10.1177/09567976251335585
M3 - Article
SN - 0956-7976
VL - 36
SP - 421
EP - 442
JO - Psychological Science
JF - Psychological Science
IS - 6
M1 - 09567976251335585
ER -