Abstract
According to prominent accounts of early action
understanding, infants’ interpretation of others’ actions is
undergirded by an assumption of utility maximization.
However, it is unclear whether this assumption applies only to
selection among actions or also to selection among goals. Here,
using an eye-tracking paradigm, we investigated whether 14-
to 16-month-old infants would predict an agent to choose a
lower-cost option when faced with two identical outcomes that
could be reached at different costs. Infants directed more looks
to the lower-cost option, and this effect was not merely due to
visual saliency. These findings corroborate the proposal that
infants rely on utility maximization when reasoning about an
agent’s likely goal and provide evidence of an early ability to
represent and compare alternatives in the context of goal
attribution.
understanding, infants’ interpretation of others’ actions is
undergirded by an assumption of utility maximization.
However, it is unclear whether this assumption applies only to
selection among actions or also to selection among goals. Here,
using an eye-tracking paradigm, we investigated whether 14-
to 16-month-old infants would predict an agent to choose a
lower-cost option when faced with two identical outcomes that
could be reached at different costs. Infants directed more looks
to the lower-cost option, and this effect was not merely due to
visual saliency. These findings corroborate the proposal that
infants rely on utility maximization when reasoning about an
agent’s likely goal and provide evidence of an early ability to
represent and compare alternatives in the context of goal
attribution.
| Original language | Undefined/Unknown |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society |
| Volume | 46 |
| Publication status | Published - 3 Jun 2024 |