Competing for seafaring labour: social security and agency employment in Chinese shipping

This paper discusses one strategy that Chinese crewing agencies adopt to compete with each
other in the global seafarer labour supplying market. This strategy is related to Chinese
seafarers’ social insurance participation. It shows that crewing agencies utilised a dual
workforce – ‘company-owned seafarers’ and ‘externally hired seafarers’. Externally hired
seafarers, though in precarious employment, are offered higher salaries in place of social
insurance coverage. By contrast, company-owned seafarers are paid less, though enjoy social
insurance arranged by agencies. This strategy serves to segment the seafarer labour market,
conceal the level playing field, and help agencies recruit seafarers cost-effectively, though in
violation of labour rights. This paper argues that this strategy grows out of the competitive
landscape co-shaped by the national regulatory and institutional settings and the global
structure of the shipping industry.